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Post-Watergate: The Legal Profession and
Respect for the Interests of Third Parties
Laurel A. Rigertas*
INTRODUCTION
As a result of Watergate, disciplinary proceedings were brought
against at least twenty-nine lawyers, which resulted in disciplinary action
against at least eighteen of them.1 Their misconduct included aiding and
abetting burglary, obstruction of justice, perjury, violation of campaign
laws and conspiracy to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, among other
charges.2 As a result of lawyers’ involvement in Watergate, the American
Bar Association (ABA) worked to improve ethical standards for lawyers to
rehabilitate the profession’s tarnished reputation. The ABA’s reform
efforts included the enactment of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(“Model Rules”) in 1983 and the adoption of a requirement that all ABA
accredited law schools provide legal ethics education.3 Subsequent events
involving lawyers, however, should cause the legal profession to question
whether these reforms adequately help lawyers navigate their often
competing roles while maintaining the trust and respect of the public that is
necessary to sustain our legal system.
There are many lenses through which one can view the events of
Watergate.4 This article, however, suggests that much of the conduct of the

*Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University, College of Law; J.D. University of Minnesota; B.S.
James Madison University. I would like to thank the Chapman Law Review for the opportunity to
speak at their symposium, The 40th Anniversary of Watergate: A Commemoration of the Rule of Law.
I also want to thank Daniel S. Reynolds and Ronald D. Rotunda for their comments on an earlier draft
and Bryant Storm and Lindsay Vanek for their research assistance.
1 N.O.B.C. Reports on Results of Watergate-Related Charges against Twenty-Nine Lawyers, 62
A.B.A. J. 1337 (Oct. 1976).
2 Infra Part I.B.
3 Infra Part II.D.
4 See, e.g., Arnold Rochvarg, Enron, Watergate and the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 43
WASHBURN L.J. 61, 61 (2003) (looking at Watergate as concerning the role of an attorney for an
organization when the attorney learns of misconduct by those acting for the organization); Fred D.
Thompson, One  Lawyer’s  Perspective  on  Watergate, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 226, 226 (1974) (viewing the
events of Watergate as generating precedents that will govern the future relationship of the executive
and legislative branches); Richard D. Schwartz, After Watergate, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 3, 4 (1973)
(seeing  the  events  of  Watergate  as  illustrating  “the  danger  that  governmental  use  of  information  control  
can threaten freedom of choice in the political process”);;   John   Blake,   Forgetting a Key Lesson from
Watergate?,
CNN.com
(Feb.
4,
2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/04/politics/
watergate-reform/index.html?iref=allsearch (viewing Watergate as a campaign finance scandal).
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lawyers who were disciplined as a result of Watergate violated the interests
of third parties, which included both individuals5 and the broader
community.6 If the lawyers had been trained and sensitized to assess the
impact of their conduct on the interests of third parties, perhaps some of
them would have paused and considered their choices more carefully.
Instead, many of them seemed to have pursued the interests of their client
or superior zealously and without any consideration of the impact on third
parties.7 Viewing the conduct of the lawyers through this lens may help
inform our understanding of subsequent events where the public has felt
betrayed by lawyers’ conduct. The conduct of lawyers frequently has
serious and foreseeable consequences on third parties that are a byproduct
of zealous advocacy. This outcome is frequently proper in our adversarial
system, but sometimes it is not. The public’s disdain for the legal
profession is particularly acute in these circumstances.8
Thus, forty years after Watergate, the legal profession should question
whether it adequately inculcates in lawyers not only respect for the rule of
law but also, specifically, respect for the interests of third parties. This is
not to suggest that a lawyer will, or should, frequently allow consideration
of a third party’s interests to trump the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to his or her
client. Indeed, the proper execution of a lawyer’s duties will often demand
the lawyer put his or her client’s interests first, even when it harms the
interests of others.
That conclusion, however, should not preclude a lawyer, who is an
agent of justice in addition to being an advocate, from routinely assessing
the consequences of his or her conduct on the interests of third parties.
Perhaps through that viewpoint some misconduct could be averted.
Furthermore, even when a lawyer concludes that the law properly demands
action of him or her that will harm the interests of third parties, this
reflection may allow the lawyer to discuss with the client not just what the
law allows, but the moral implications of taking a legally permissible
course of action; in other words, to advise the client on the right thing to
do.
These moments of reflection may also allow for important
consideration of whether the law as written has struck the right balance
between loyalty to one’s client and the interests in justice, or whether
reform is necessary. Lastly, if the public viewed lawyers as a group that is

See infra notes 93, 96 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., In the Matter of Wild, 361 A.2d 182, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (suspending attorney
Claude Wild from the practice of law for one year following his conviction for violating campaign
finance laws and quoting the sentencing judge who noted that the crime may be one worse than a crime
of  violence  because  it  “is  corrupting  our  government”).
7 Infra Part I.B.
8 See John E. Montgomery, Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts Into Legal
Education: Strengthening the Professionalism of Law Students, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 323, 333 (2008)
(lack of civility and overly aggressive tactics may not necessarily be ethical violations but the public
frequently views them harshly and with distaste).
5
6
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constantly mindful of how its conduct affects other people, that perspective
may aid in improving the public’s opinion of the legal profession.
No single reform can likely instill in lawyers a routine practice of
assessing how their actions impact third parties and how to include the
interests of third parties in the framework they use to assess difficult ethical
situations. Instead, a variety of reforms would probably be required to
create such a cultural shift. This article suggests two areas of reform for
consideration: the Model Rules and legal education.
The Model Rules and its predecessors, the 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics and the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, articulate a need for lawyers to comply with the rule of law
during their representation of clients, as well as in their personal affairs.9
Each of these guidelines clearly prohibited the violation of the criminal
laws that many of the lawyers involved in Watergate committed.10 The
Model Rules and its predecessors also all contain provisions that expressly
or implicitly are concerned with the rights of third parties in some specific
situations, such as a lawyer’s duty not to make false statements of material
fact to third parties.11 However, neither the Model Rules nor its
predecessors contain a broad principle that a lawyer’s ethical decisionmaking framework should be informed, at least in part, by the impact of the
lawyer’s conduct on the interests of third parties. Such a principle could be
included in the Model Rules, probably not as a standard for disciplinary
enforcement, but as a general guiding principle such as those set forth in
the Preamble.
Next, legal education can help future lawyers develop an analytical
framework to consider ethical dilemmas, in part, through the perspective of
third parties. Increasingly, legal ethics education has used a problem-based
pedagogy to put ethical dilemmas in context and to give students the
opportunity to assess problems from different roles, such as lawyer, client,
third-party neutral and judge.12 Such roles could also include third parties
impacted by lawyers’ conduct, which could broaden the perspective
through which ethical problems are viewed and analyzed. Additionally,
legal ethics education may benefit from the growing dialogue about
developing the emotional intelligence of law students and lawyers.
Emotional intelligence includes developing empathy for others and an
understanding of their perspective, which could be valuable to legal ethics
education.13
Legal education can also help train lawyers to do a better job of
educating their clients about the role of lawyers and the limits on their role.

9
10
11
12
13

Infra Part II.B–D.
Infra Part II.B–D.
Infra Part II.B–D.
Infra Part IV.B.
Infra Part IV.B.
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The conduct of the actors involved in Watergate has, in many instances,
been explained by the context in which the actors were placed—
specifically the White House and all of its power and prestige.14 There is
undoubtedly some truth to that explanation, but it would be an
overstatement to say that the motivations of the actors were unique to that
powerful setting. In today’s competitive business world, private attorneys
must compete vigorously to retain their clients’ business or risk losing
income and frequently job security. This can create incredible pressure to
satisfy the demands of clients, who are not bound by the professional rules
of ethics and frequently are not even interested in hearing about them.15
Thus, lawyers need to do a better job of communicating with their clients
about the limits of their role. No matter which lawyer a client sees, that
client should hear a clear and consistent message that the lawyer is not
there to win at all costs, but to advocate for the client within the parameters
of the facts and the law, while treating third parties with dignity and
respect.
Part I of this article gives a brief overview of Watergate and focuses
on the specific conduct of some of the lawyers who were disciplined. Part
II of this article gives an overview of the history the American Bar
Association’s efforts to codify ethical rules including the promulgation of
the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Part III will discuss postWatergate events involving lawyers that have impaired the public’s trust of
the profession, which suggest there is still room for improvement. Lastly,
Part IV will discuss possible reforms to the Model Rules and legal
education that could help instill in lawyers a principle of evaluating the
impact of their conduct on third parties as a routine part of legal practice
and ethical decision-making.
I. WATERGATE
A.

A General Overview
While the events that comprise what is now referred to collectively as
“Watergate” are extensive, this article will only briefly outline some of the
events to provide context for a more detailed exploration of the actions of
some of the individual lawyers involved in Watergate. The epicenter of
Watergate occurred on June 17, 1972, when five men were arrested at the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) offices located in the Watergate
Hotel.16 This break-in was part of a broader campaign strategy devised by
Nixon and his aides aimed at attacking Nixon’s Democratic opponent in the

Infra Part III.
Infra Part III.
Tad Szulc, Democratic Raid Tied to Realtor, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1972, at 1; SAM J. ERVIN,
JR., THE WHOLE TRUTH: THE WATERGATE CONSPIRACY 7 (1980).
14
15
16
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1972 campaign.17 This strategy included bugging the offices of the DNC in
order to obtain political intelligence.18
The men arrested on June 17, 1992, were James McCord, who was
working for the Committee to Re-elect the President (CRP)19 and four
Cubans.20 Those involved in planning and authorizing the break-in
included Gordon Liddy (a lawyer), Jeb Magruder, and John Mitchell, the
former U.S. Attorney General who had left that post to work for CRP and
take over the management of Nixon’s re-election campaign.21 The break-in
occurred just months before Nixon won the 1972 election by a landslide for
a second term.22 The events that collectively comprise “Watergate,”
however, span the years before and after the break-in.
In many ways, the story of Watergate began in 1971, when The New
York Times began publishing the Pentagon Papers, a top-secret study
regarding the Vietnam War, which Daniel Ellsberg had leaked to the
press.23 Responding to this leak, the White House formed the “Plumbers,”
a group tasked with plugging information leaks.24 Members of the
“Plumbers” included Egil “Bud” Krogh (a lawyer), G. Gordon Liddy (a
lawyer) and Howard Hunt, a former employee of the Central Intelligence
Agency.25
The “Plumbers” sought to discredit Daniel Ellsberg’s character and
mental stability, which was the motivation behind a burglary of the offices
of Dr. Fielding, Ellsberg’s psychiatrist.26 Members of the “Plumbers,”
including Krogh authorized the burglary, which was carried out by a team
that included Liddy, Hunt and four Cubans.27 It was these same four
Cubans who, along with James McCord, (McCord was working for CRP),
subsequently broke into the DNC offices at Watergate.28 This fact, in large
part, appears to have motivated Nixon and the White House’s cover-up of
the Watergate break-in.29 While direct ties between CRP’s Watergate
break-in and the White House were weak, the ties between the White
House and the break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office were stronger; this made

ERVIN, supra note 16, at 3–4.
Id. at 5.
19 Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 61–62.
20 ERVIN, supra note 16, at 7–8.
21 Id. at 4, 40.
22 Id. at  10   (“President   Nixon   was   returned to the White House over his Democratic opponent,
Senator   George   S.   McGovern,   by   a   landslide   victory   in   which   he   received   520   of   the   nation’s   538  
electoral votes and 60.8 percent of  its  popular  votes.”).
23 Id. at 120.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 105–06, 120.
26 Id. at 106.
27 JOHN W. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION: THE END OF THE STORY 506–10 (2009); see N.O.B.C.
Reports, supra note 1, at 1337 (listing lawyers who were involved in Watergate-related activities).
28 DEAN, supra note 27, at 101–02; ERVIN, supra note 16, at 10.
29 See infra note 31.
17
18
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the President vulnerable to being implicated in wrongdoing.30 Because
four of the men involved in the break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office were taken
into custody and faced criminal charges for the Watergate break-in, the
President’s administration apparently perceived a threat that those men
would disclose information about the break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office and
the role of the White House, as part of a plea bargain.31 And thus, the
Watergate cover-up began.
Concerns about additional leaks also caused Nixon to want to obtain
Morton Halperin’s papers from the Brookings Institute because there were
reports that those papers would extend the Pentagon Papers into the time
frame of Nixon’s administration.32 Breaking in and stealing the papers was
not feasible because they were believed to be in a very secure vault inside
the building.33 Nixon’s Special Counsel, Chuck Colson (a lawyer),34
proposed a plan to firebomb the Brookings Institute to create chaos and
provide an opportunity to gain access to the facility. 35 This plan was
abandoned after White House Counsel John Dean raised an objection to
it.36 While Dean’s intervention stopped this plan, instead of viewing
Dean’s objections as wise counsel, some of the President’s inner circle
viewed him as having some “little old lady” in him.37 In other words, those
in power seemed to send a message that the people ready and willing to do
the President’s bidding should not feel constrained by the law.
The combination of the Ellsberg and Watergate break-ins set the stage
for the events after the Watergate break-in, when the White House and
many individuals associated with it engaged in cover-up activities38 that
would result in a multitude of criminal charges.39 These events, and others,
arose in an environment in which the White House and the presidency were
30 Nixon never admitted to knowing about the Ellsberg break-in prior to March 1973—eighteen
months after the break-in occurred. FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN
POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 210 (1994). However his close aides were apparently
never sure of this, and were concerned that he could be implicated. See DEAN, supra note 27, at 240–41,
314–16.
31 DEAN, supra note 27, at 101–06.
32 Id. at 43. “Although  the  Pentagon  Papers  did  not  deal  directly  with  the  Nixon  administration,  
the president believed that publishing the papers would undermine his efforts to control Vietnam
policy.”  MICHAEL A. GENOVESE, THE WATERGATE CRISIS 15 (1999).
33 DEAN, supra note 27, at 43.
34 See infra notes 66, 67 and accompanying text.
35 DEAN, supra note 27, at 43.
36 Id. at 43–46.
37 Id. at 46.
38 Id. at 532–36. John Dean wrote:
Bud   Krogh’s   explanation   as   to   why   the   cover-up occurred—that the Ellsberg-related
burglary was at the core of the cover-up—is correct, at least as far as the White House
was concerned. This fact was well understood by all who were involved in the coverup, although it has been left to only Bud and myself to acknowledge it, since Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, and Mitchell went to their graves either pretending they did not understand
why the cover-up occurred or denied that anything untoward had, in fact, happened.
Id. at 529.
39 Lyman M. Tondel, Jr., Watergate: The Public Lawyer and The Bar as seen from the
Perspective of the ABA Ethics Committee, 30 BUS. LAW. 295, 296 (1975).
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in many instances viewed as infallible and above the law.40 There seems to
have been a general attitude that began with Nixon that the ends sought by
the White House justified any means. For example, with respect to the
documents Nixon wanted from the Brookings Institute, tapes of Nixon
reveal demands from him such as, “Goddamnit, get in [the Brookings
Institute] and get those files. Blow the safe and get it,” and “You’re to
break into the place, rifle the files, and bring them in.”41 In 1975 Dean
Weckstein wrote about this attitude among the Watergate actors:
There is a difference in application, but not in underlying principle, between
those who would state that it is a lawyer’s duty to use any means (legal or illegal;
honest or dishonest) to get his client off or otherwise achieve a victory and those
who would break into a psychiatrist’s office or engage in illegal wiretapping in
the name of national security or to get their candidate elected and save the world
from George McGovern.42

B.

Lawyers’ Crimes and Discipline
The criminal offenses of some of the lawyers involved in Watergate
included “ordering, acquiescing in, participating in, or helping to cover up
burglaries and thefts; illegal wiretapping; obstruction of justice; perjury;
violations of campaign contribution laws; [and] giving and accepting
bribes.”43 Most of these lawyers were not acting in their capacity as a
lawyer when they engaged in misconduct.44 This did not, however, prevent
them from being subject to discipline by the states and courts in which they
were admitted to practice.45 Nor did that fact prevent damage to the
reputation of lawyers and their role in the administration of justice.46
John Dean, former White House Counsel, famously testified before
the Senate Watergate Committee in 1973 about a list he had made of all the
people that he thought had violated the law.47 He had put an asterisk next
to ten of the names on the list, each of whom was a lawyer.48 Senator
Talmadge questioned Dean about the significance of the marks and Dean
responded, “[T]hat was just a reaction to myself, the fact that how in God’s
name could so many lawyers get involved in something like this?”49
Dean’s list turned out to be modest.

See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
DEAN, supra note 27, at 32–33; STANLEY I. KUTLER, ABUSE OF POWER: THE NEW NIXON
TAPES 3, 6 (1997).
42 Donald T. Weckstein, Watergate and the Law Schools, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 261, 270
(1975). He   also   wrote,   “We   must   encourage   our   law   students   to   accept   the   priority   of   process   over  
results  and  means  over  ends  .  .  .  .”  Id.
43 Tondel, supra note 39, at 296.
44 See Stuart E. Hertzberg, Watergate: Has the Image of the Lawyer Been Diminished?, 79
COMM. L.J. 73, 74 (1974).
45 See Clark, infra note 50.
46 See, e.g., Weckstein, supra note 42, at 271; Hertzberg, supra note 44, at 74.
47 John W. Dean, III, Watergate: What Was It?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 611 (2000).
48 Id.
49 Id.
40
41
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The National Organization of Bar Counsel created a Special
Committee on the Co-ordination of Watergate Discipline in 1973.50 The
committee issued its final report in 1976 and reported that disciplinary
proceedings had been initiated against twenty-nine lawyers in connection
with Watergate-related matters.51 The report disclosed that seven of the
lawyers involved had been disbarred (President Nixon among them), public
disciplinary action had been taken against another eleven other lawyers,
and as of 1976 no public disciplinary action had been reported against the
remaining eleven lawyers.52
While many of the actions of the disciplined lawyers involved
violations of the law that were more injurious to society as a whole, many
of the violations of the law also directly infringed on the rights and interests
of individuals. For example, in the opinion that disbarred Nixon from the
New York Bar, the Court’s description of Nixon’s misconduct included
conduct that directly violated the rights of Dr. Fielding, who had his office
broken into, and Daniel Ellsberg, whose personal legal defense was
obstructed:
Mr. Nixon improperly . . . attempted to obstruct an investigation by the United
States Department of Justice of an unlawful entry into the offices of Dr. Lewis
Fielding, a psychiatrist who had treated Daniel Ellsberg; improperly concealed
and encouraged others to conceal evidence relating to unlawful activities of
members of his staff and of the Committee to Re-elect the President; and
improperly engaged in conduct which he knew or should have known would
interfere with the legal defense of Daniel Ellsberg.53

Egil “Bud” Krogh, the Deputy Assistant for Domestic Affairs to the
President of the United States and later Undersecretary of Transportation,
was also disbarred.54 Krogh recalled a meeting where President Nixon’s
Chief of Staff, Bob Haldeman, and Chief Domestic Advisor, John
Ehrlichman, told Krogh, “[Y]ou have one client. And that client is Richard
Nixon.”55 Krogh has since reflected, “The choice of words was deliberate.
Our client was a person, not the President or the presidency. And we were
to serve his wishes as zealously as we could.”56
As a member of the White House “Plumbers,” Krogh was instructed
that the President wanted him to investigate the leak of the Pentagon Papers
with the “utmost zeal,” and to utilize whatever means the government had
at its disposal to stop leaks of information that the President considered a
matter of national security.57 This led to Krogh’s involvement in adopting
50 N.O.B.C. Reports, supra note 1, at 1337; see also Kathleen Clark, The Legacy of Watergate for
Legal Ethics Instruction, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 673, 678–79 (2000).
51 N.O.B.C. Reports, supra note 1, at 1337.
52 Id.; see also Clark, supra note 50, at 678–79.
53 In re Nixon, 53 A.D.2d 178, 179–80 (N.Y. App. 1976).
54 In re Krogh, 536 P.2d 578, 589–90 (Wash. 1975).
55 Lynne Reaves, Ethics in Action: Two Recall Watergate Lessons, 70 A.B.A. J. 35, 35 (1984).
56 Id.
57 In re Krogh, 536 P.2d at 579–80.
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a plan whereby Howard Hunt, another member of the “Plumbers,” would
break into the office of Dr. Fielding, Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, in an
effort to steal records that could depict Ellsberg as someone who was
unreliable and untrustworthy.58
The Supreme Court of Washington’s opinion that disbarred Krogh
focused on his guilty plea to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy
against the rights of citizens), which was a felony.59 The charges against
Krogh included specific violations of Dr. Fielding’s rights:
[T]hat while the respondent was an officer and employee of the United States
Government, [he] . . . unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did combine,
conspire, confederate and agree with his co-conspirators to injure, oppress,
threaten and intimidate Dr. Lewis J. Fielding, a citizen of the United States, in
the free exercise and enjoyment of a right and privilege secured to him by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and to conceal such activities. It
further charged that the co-conspirators did, without legal process, probable
cause, search warrant or other lawful authority, enter the offices of Dr. Fielding
in Los Angeles County, California, with the intent to search for, examine and
photograph documents and records containing confidential information
concerning Daniel Ellsberg, and thereby injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate
Dr. Fielding in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right and privilege secured
to him by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to be
secure in his person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures . . . . To all of these allegations, the respondent had pleaded guilty. 60

As otherwise stated by the court, Krogh not only flagrantly
disregarded the laws of the United States, but also the fundamental rights of
citizens.61
The court’s opinion indicated that perhaps the environment in which
Krogh was functioning helped lead him astray:
[Krogh] indicated that he had been blinded, perhaps, by the power of the
Presidency or what he conceived to be its power. A number of men who
submitted letters attesting to his good character expressed the concern that they
in the same circumstances might have behaved in much the same manner. 62

Id. at 580.
Id. at 578.
60 Id. at 579. The opinion states that Krogh became distressed when he learned that the burglars
had left evidence of their break-in  “not, it appears, because  of  concern  of  Dr.   Fielding’s  property  but  
rather because of the fear that an investigation of the burglary might lead to a discovery of the identity
of  the  perpetrators.”  Id. at 580.
61 Id. at 584.
62 Id. at 583; see also D.C. Bar v. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d 146, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (order
suspending former Attorney General of the United States Richard Kleindienst from the practice of law
for thirty days  and  stating  “that  respondent  is  a  man  of  high  professional  stature,  with  correspondingly  
high   obligations,   who   was   caught   up   in   a   ‘highly   charged   political   atmosphere   .   .   .   when   pressed   by  
political  opponents’.”);;  In  the  Matter  of  Wild,  361  A.2d  182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (order suspending
attorney Claude Wild from the practice of law for one year acknowledged that Wild had been pressured
by the Nixon administration to make illegal campaign contributions on behalf of his employer, Gulf Oil,
and that he feared reprisals to his employer if he did not make the donation). Sam Dash, the chief
counsel  to  the  Senate  Watergate  Committee  also  wrote  about  the  tension  between  a  lawyer’s  obligation  
58
59
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Krogh seems to have given little thought to the impact of his conduct on
others at the time of his actions; he was focused on his and his superior’s
interests.63
Krogh’s reasoning for pleading guilty to the criminal charges suggests
a later-developed appreciation of his violations of the rights of third parties.
Krogh explained:
I had a chance to sit back and sort of look at where I was. I was under indictment
in both California and Washington and yet I was a person that was at large, free
to travel, free to associate with whomever I wished. I could say what I wanted to
and if I said it to certain individuals it would get reported. I could attend any
church of my choice. There were a number of things I was enjoying as a
defendant, potential defendant in a criminal trial and yet here I was defending
conduct when I was a government servant which had stripped another individual
of his Fourth Amendment rights to be secure from an illegal search, and I
suppose it was that I felt that if I had continued to defend that, I would in a sense
be attacking the very rights which I was enjoying at that time as a potential
defendant.64

Charles Colson, White House Aide and Special Counsel to President
Nixon, was also disbarred following his conviction for obstruction of
justice.65 The charges to which Colson pled guilty included impeding and
obstructing justice in connection with the criminal trial of Daniel Ellsberg
by “devising and implementing a scheme to defame and destroy the public
image and credibility of Daniel Ellsberg and those engaged in the legal
defense of Daniel Ellsberg, with the intent to influence, obstruct and
impede the conduct and outcome of the criminal prosecution . . . .”66 These
activities were done at the behest of President Nixon who was angered by
the release of the Pentagon Papers and had instructed Colson to stop the
leaks of sensitive information “no matter what the cost,” including
disseminating material to the news media that would “expose” Ellsberg and
his motives.67 There is, of course, a societal interest in the integrity of
criminal proceedings; but in addition, Daniel Ellsberg and his counsel also
had an individual interest that was infringed by this conduct—namely the
to  do  the  right  thing  and  a  client’s  expectations  of  a  lawyer.     With respect to teaching legal ethics he
wrote:
It’s  nice  to  talk  about  these  things  theoretically  in  law  school.    But  in  the  real   world  the  
choice a lawyer sometimes has to make is to stand up to a client who wants to do
something wrong and say no. And by standing up to him you may lose your job.
Reaves, supra note 55, at 35.
63 The opinion disbarring Krogh states that he became distressed when he learned that the
burglars had left evidence of their break-in “not,   it   appears, because   of   concern   of   Dr.   Fielding’s  
property but rather because of the fear that an investigation of the burglary might lead to a discovery of
the  identity  of  the  perpetrators.” In re Krogh, 536 P.2d at 580.
64 Id. at 581.
65 In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1161–62 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
66 Id. at 1162–63. Some of the specific acts included releasing defamatory allegations about one
of   Ellsberg’s   attorneys   and   attempting   to   obtain   and   release   derogatory   information   about   Daniel  
Ellsberg, including his psychiatric files. Id. at 1163.
67 Id.
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right to be free from lawyers falsely attacking their public image and
reputation through illicit means.
Another actor in Watergate, attorney Donald Segretti, was hired by
two members of Nixon’s staff, Dwight Chapin and Gordon Strachan, to
pull pranks on Democratic presidential aspirants in order to cause internal
divisions and prevent the party from uniting around one candidate.68 In
short, “[Segretti] repeatedly committed acts of deceit designed to subvert
the free electoral process.”69 As a result of these activities, Donald Segretti
was convicted of violating campaign laws.70 He was subsequently
suspended from the practice of law for two years as a result of those
convictions.71
Segretti’s “pranks” certainly subverted society’s interest in an honest
election process, but his activities also invaded the interests of specific
individuals. For example, Segretti wrote and distributed a letter on the
Citizens for Muskie Committee letterhead, without its consent, which
falsely accused Senators Humphrey and Jackson (both candidates for the
Democratic nomination for President) of sexual improprieties.72 Both
Senators Humphrey and Jackson had the individual right not to have a
lawyer knowingly publicize false accusations about them. Segretti also
wrote another letter on Senator Humphrey’s stationery, without his consent,
falsely alleging that Representative Shirley Chisholm, also a Democratic
candidate, had been committed to a mental institution and was still under
psychiatric care.73 Senator Humphrey had the right not to have his identity
misappropriated, and Representative Chisholm had the right not to have
false accusations knowingly made about her mental capacities. Perhaps
Segretti recognized this when he testified before the Senate Watergate
Committee, “To the extent the activities have harmed other persons and the
political process, I have the deepest regret.”74
The California Supreme Court not only suspended Segretti from the
practice of law, it also ordered that he (and all future suspended members
of the bar) pass the then newly instituted Professional Responsibility
Examination as a condition of reinstatement.75 The court wrote, “In short,
In re Segretti, 544 P.2d 929, 930 (Cal. 1976).
Id. at 934.
Id. at 930. Specifically, Segretti was convicted of violating federal law prohibiting the
publication or distribution of statements relating to presidential candidates without disclosing the names
of the persons or organizations responsible for the publication or distribution, as well as conspiracy to
commit such acts. Id.
71 Id. at 936.
72 Id. at 931.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 934 n.5. Other disciplinary actions included the disbarment of John Mitchell, former
Attorney General of the United States, after his conviction for conspiracy, perjury and obstruction of
justice, In re Mitchell, 351 N.E.2d 743, 744–45 (N.Y. 1976), and the disbarment of Gordon Liddy
following his conviction for several crimes, including burglary in the second degree. In re Liddy, 343
N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
75 In re Segretti, 544 P.2d at 936–37.
68
69
70
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although we cannot insure that any attorney will in fact behave ethically,
we can at least be certain that he is fully aware of what his ethical duties
are.”76
In the early to mid-1970s, as the events of Watergate were still
unfolding, some members of the legal profession made comments that
expressed concern about the Watergate participants’ disregard for the rights
and dignity of third parties. For example, in 1973 ABA President Robert
Meserve spoke to the ABA about Watergate and quoted the late John Lord
O’Brian who wrote, “The whole American way of life, to say nothing of
the confidence of the citizens in the government, is based, as we all know,
upon a belief in the dignity of the individual accompanied by a pervasive
sense of intelligent toleration and respect for the rights of the others.”77
Meserve observed that perhaps “the belief in individual dignity and
the deliberate promotion of mutual respect and tolerance” had suffered the
most damage from Watergate.78
Attorney Elliot L. Richardson, who gave an address at the ABA’s
1974 annual convention, had some similar reflections on the cause of
Watergate and the continued presence of the cause:
The problem is that the forces underlying Watergate morality persist. And very
important among these forces, although not sufficiently appreciated as such, is
the decline of a sense of community . . . . Those who lack a sense of community
become prone to a rootless kind of amorality that makes them easily influenced
by the institutional value systems to which they happen for the time being to
belong.79

Richardson went on to state that such rootlessness may lead to the
“sustained pursuit of self-interest,” and that such “[e]xcessive absorption in
self-interest leads, in turn, to individualism unconstrained by respect for
other individuals.”80 Richardson further stated, “Indeed, where there is true
respect for other people—the awareness that each is a unique, sacrosanct
individual equal in dignity to every other human being—there is awareness
of obligation which is higher and more sensitive than any requirement of
the law.”81
Richardson’s address is somewhat reminiscent of Justice Brandeis’
comments in a 1933 speech where he opined that the reason that lawyers do
not hold a high position with the people is not because of a lack of
opportunity, but because “[i]nstead of holding a position of independence,
between the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the excesses of

76
77
78
79

added).
80
81

Id. at 936.
Robert W. Meserve, The Legal Profession and Watergate, 59 A.B.A. J. 985, 986 (1973).
Id.
Elliot L. Richardson, The Watergate Morality, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 267, 269 (1974–75) (emphasis
Id.
Id. at 271.
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either, able lawyers have, to a large extent, allowed themselves to become
adjuncts of great corporations and have neglected the obligation to use their
powers for the protection of the people.”82
II. POST-WATERGATE LEGAL REFORMS
At the time of Watergate, the ABA’s 1969 Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (“Code”) was the national model of ethical
rules that influenced the codes of conduct adopted by the various states.
The ABA revisited the Code in 1977, when it formed the Commission on
the Evaluation of Professional standards, known as the Kutak Commission,
to recommend changes to the Code.83 The result was the ABA’s adoption
of the 1983 Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rules”), which remains the
predominant guide for the states today. However, in order to examine the
evolution of ethical rules and their perception of the role of the lawyer in
society, it will be helpful to start our review of ethical guidelines in the
mid-1800s. The perception of the lawyer’s role has slightly shifted over
time from one who is a member of the community, charged with
maintaining independence and keeping an eye on justice, to one who is
more of a partisan advocate who has less independence from the directives
of his or her client.84 This shift may underlie part of the cause of
Watergate, and it still persists today.
A.

Ethics before the ABA’s Involvement
Before the ABA drafted the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908,
there were several early statements of ethics that influenced the
development of the ABA’s 1908 Canons. First, David Hoffman’s 1846
book A Course of Legal Study contains one of the earliest American
statements of lawyers’ ethics in a section titled “Fifty Resolutions in regard
to Professional Development” (“Resolutions”).85
The Resolutions
contemplated the lawyer’s role as a moral agent of justice as being
paramount to the lawyer’s role as a zealous advocate under the law.
Otherwise stated, Hoffman believed that moral law, which he understood to
have a religious foundation, took priority over positive law.86 For example,
the Resolutions provided the following with respect to the representation of
a defendant who the lawyer knows has committed a crime:
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 337 (1933).
ABA, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES v (1987) [hereinafter ABA, THE MODEL RULES AND
THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES].
84 Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics—II The
Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 220–22 (2002).
85 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE
PROFESSION GENERALLY 752–75 (1846). Hoffman drafted this book to be the curriculum at his planned
law school at the University of Maryland. James M. Altman, Considering  the  A.B.A.’s  1908  Canons  of  
Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2422 (2003).
86 Altman, supra note 85, at 2423. Hoffman’s   resolutions   included: “What   is   morally   wrong,
cannot be professionally right . . . .” HOFFMAN, supra note 85, at 765.
82
83
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Persons of atrocious character, who have violated the laws of God and man, are
entitled to no such special exertions from any member of our pure and
honourable profession; and, indeed, to no intervention beyond securing them a
fair and dispassionate investigation of the facts of their cause, and the due
application of the law: all that goes beyond this, either in manner or substance, is
unprofessional, and proceeds, either from a mistaken view of the relation of
client and counsel, or from some unworthy and selfish motive, which sets a
higher value on professional display and success, than on truth and justice, and
the substantial interests of the community. 87

Other Resolutions regarding civil matters contained similar principles.
For example, the Resolutions admonished a lawyer never to plead the
statute of limitations if that was the only defense available and the client
was conscious of owing a debt.88 Similarly, the Resolutions stated that
lawyers “will never plead, or otherwise avail of the bar of Infancy, against
an honest demand” if the client has the ability to pay and has no other
defense.89 They also stated that even if the law provided for such a
defense, the lawyer should independently judge whether its use was proper
under the circumstances.90 One writer described Hoffman’s moral
philosophy as follows, “He maintains that attorneys must independently
consult their consciences when conducting their cases and should not press
claims that would make bad law. Hoffman’s moral system, then, is
explicitly premised on the assumption that men’s consciences will
accurately reflect shared community norms.”91
The next influential statement of lawyers’ ethical duties was George
Sharswood’s “An Essay on Professional Ethics,” which was published in
1884 and then reprinted in 1907.92 Sharswood also emphasized the
importance of a lawyer’s conscience in the course of his professional work,
but his approach has been described as more nuanced than Hoffman’s.93
With respect to defendants, Sharswood believed that the value of lawyers
in the adversary system provided sufficient justification for a lawyer to
represent a client who the lawyer believed had committed a wrong.94
However, his view was more akin to Hoffman’s when it came to
representing a plaintiff in a civil case. In that situation, Sharswood wrote
HOFFMAN, supra note 85, at 756.
Id. at 754.
89 Id. at 754–55.
90 Id.
91 Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar
Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471, 494 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
92 GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1993).
93 Altman, supra note 85, at 2427–29.
Because Sharswood emphasizes, much more than Hoffman, the importance of the
adversary process to the administration of justice and acknowledges, to a much greater
extent,  that  the  lawyer’s  professional  role  is  shaped  by  that  process,  Sharswood’s  view  of  
the  lawyer’s  duty  ‘when  the  legal demands or interests of his client conflict with his own
sense  of  what  is  just  and  right’  is  much  more  nuanced  than  Hoffman’s.
Id. at 2427.
94 Id. at 2428–29.
87
88
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that a lawyer has “an undoubted right, and [is] in duty bound, to refuse to
be concerned for a plaintiff in the pursuit of a demand, which offends his
sense of what is just and right.”95 Sharswood also wrote that, other than the
ministry, there was no profession other than the law where a “high-toned
morality” was imperative; indeed “[h]igh moral principle is [the lawyer’s]
only safe guide; the only torch to light his way amidst darkness and
obstruction.”96
Lastly, the first code of ethics formally adopted in the country was the
Alabama State Bar Association’s Code (“Alabama Code”), adopted in
1887.97 The Alabama Code also contemplated that a lawyer’s role as an
advocate would be subordinate to his own moral views and to his
obligations to third parties:
[A]ccording to the Alabama Code, the lawyer’s duty of zealous representation is
subject to the lawyer’s greater obligations to (i) the legal system, i.e. ‘obedience
to law’; (ii) third parties; i.e. ‘the obligation to his neighbor’; and (iii) his own
moral view of right and wrong or, in other words, what was just and unjust in the
eyes of his God; i.e. ‘accountability to the Creator.’98

The Alabama Code heavily influenced the ABA’s Canons of
Professional Ethics, with some provisions of the Canons being derived
primarily from the language in the Alabama Code.99
B.

The Evolution of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Since its formation, the American Bar Association has adopted three
major iterations of ethical guidelines for lawyers in the United States—the
1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Each
document gives some consideration of the role of morality in lawyering,
although the emphasis on the lawyer’s role as a moral actor arguably
decreases with each version. Each document has also contained language
regarding the need for lawyers to operate within the bounds of the law in
order to uphold the public’s respect for the law and the legal profession,
which are important rationales. None of these documents, however,
explicitly state that upholding the rule of law frequently serves another
broad purpose—it prevents a lawyer from becoming an instrument in the
violation of the rights of third parties.

Id.
SHARSWOOD, supra note 92, at 55. Sharswood also wrote,  “The  client  has  no  right  to  require  
[the lawyer] to be illiberal—and he should throw up his brief sooner than do what revolts against his
own  sense  of  what  is  demanded  by  honor  and  propriety.”   Id. at 74–75. Sharswood also acknowledges
that there are not necessarily easy answers when the legal demands and interests of the client conflict
with  the  lawyer’s  own  sense  of  what  is  just  and  right.  Id. at 81.
97 Altman, supra note 85, at 2437.
98 Id. at 2448 (emphasis added).
99 Id. at 2453.
95
96
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While all of the documents contain some sections that give parameters
about lawyers’ treatment of third parties in certain circumstances, none of
them specifically set out third parties as an important beneficiary of
adherence to the rule of law or as a specific consideration that should
inform a lawyer’s ethical decision-making regarding his or her actions.
This is not to suggest that a lawyer’s loyalty to his or her client is not going
to trump consideration of a third party’s rights at times; indeed, sometimes
the proper role of a lawyer will demand that outcome. That reality,
however, should not preclude a lawyer from thinking through the
implications of his or her conduct regarding the rights of third parties and,
perhaps through that lens, some misconduct could be averted.
Furthermore, even when a lawyer concludes that the law properly demands
action of him or her that will harm the interests of third parties, this
reflection may allow the lawyer to discuss with the client not just what the
law allows, but the moral implications of taking a legally permissible
course of action. At other times, the lawyer may conclude that the law
demands action of him or her that will harm the rights of the third parties,
but these moments may allow for important reflection on whether the law
as written has struck the right balance between advocacy and interests in
justice.100 Working to reform and improve the law is also within the proper
role of all lawyers.101
C.

The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics
In 1908 the ABA promulgated the Canons of Professional Ethics
(“Canons”).102 The Canons are believed to be, at least in part, a response to
President Theodore Roosevelt’s criticism of the legal profession,
particularly corporate lawyers.103 In 1905 President Roosevelt gave a
speech at Harvard where he made the following statements about the legal
profession:
Every man of great wealth who runs his business with cynical contempt for those
prohibitions of the law which by hired cunning he can escape or evade is a
menace to our community; and the community is not to be excused if it does not
develop a spirit which actively frowns on and discountenances him. The great
profession of the law should be that profession whose members ought to take the
lead in the creation of just such a spirit. We all know that, as things actually are,
many of the most influential and most highly remunerated members of the bar in
every centre of wealth make it their special task to work out bold and ingenious
schemes by which their very wealthy clients, individual or corporate, can evade

See infra Part IV.A.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 6 (2009) (“As a public citizen, a lawyer should
seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of
service rendered by the legal  profession.”).
102 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS (1908).
103 Altman, supra note 85, at 2403.
100
101
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the laws which are made to regulate in the interest of the public the use of great
wealth.104

Hoffman’s Resolutions, Sharswood’s essay on ethics, and the
Alabama State Bar Association’s 1887 Code all had some influence on the
drafters of the Canons.105 There is also support for the view that, by the
late 1800s, lawyers were viewing their responsibilities to their clients as
their primary, and perhaps exclusive, moral obligation and the Canons were
drafted to try to counter that trend.106 While heavily influenced by the
Alabama Code, one writer has argued that the Canons “express a more
robust vision of conscientious lawyering that enlarges the authority of, and
gives greater support to, the lawyer’s moral autonomy in the
relationship.”107 The Canons “prescribed a vision of conscientious
lawyering” where “a special obligation for achieving moral and legal
justice” limited zealous advocacy.108
The Preamble to the Canons underscored the need for the public’s
faith in the legal profession: “The future of the Republic, to a great extent,
depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied. It cannot be
so 85 maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our
profession are such as to merit the approval of all just men.”109 Believing
that no set of rules could be codified to govern the behavior of lawyers, the
Canons adopted broad ethical principles to provide general guidelines.110
The Canons contained principles that cautioned lawyers to limit their
zealous advocacy by adherence to the rule of law. For example, the
Canons expressly stated that the rule of law constrained a lawyer’s
obligation to zealously advocate for his client and recognized the damage
to the profession’s reputation when the public viewed lawyers as not being
bound by the law:
Nothing operates more certainly to create or foster popular prejudice against
lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public
esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than
does the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable
transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to
succeed in winning his client’s cause . . . . The office of attorney does not permit,

104 President Theodore Roosevelt, Speech at Harvard University (June 28, 1905), available at
http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/research/txtspeeches/143.txt. One scholar has suggested
that  the  ABA’s  formation  of  the  1908  Code  of  Professional  Ethics  stemmed  from  this  speech.  Altman,
supra note 85, at 2409.
105 Altman, supra note 85, at 2400; see also David O. Burbank & Robert S. Duboff, Were the
Watergate Lawyers an Exception?, 3 B. LEADER 17, 17 (1978).
106 Altman, supra note 85, at 2447.
107 Id. at 2441.
108 Id. at 2401.
109 CANONS
OF
PROF’L
ETHICS
Preamble
(1908),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/Canons_Ethics.authcheckdam.pdf.
110 Id.
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much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of
fraud or chicane. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.111

Canons 32 further advised that the lawyer
advances the honor of his profession and the best interests of his client when he
renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his
undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law. He must
also observe and advise his client to observe the statute law . . . .112

This drafting appears to place primary consideration on moral law and
secondary consideration on positive law. It may also have been the
drafter’s most direct response to President Roosevelt’s concerns.113 Many
of the drafters shared his concerns about the increased commercialization
of the legal profession “as a general threat to the moral autonomy of the
lawyer in the attorney-client relationship.”114
The Canons did recognize that in performing his duties, the lawyer’s
treatment of third parties had some specific limits. For example, the
Canons made clear that clients, not lawyers, are the litigants and that
clients’ animosity towards each other should not influence a lawyer’s
treatment of opposing counsel or parties.115 Canon 18 stated,
A lawyer should always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and due
consideration . . . . The client cannot be made the keeper of the lawyer’s
conscience in professional matters. He has no right to demand that his counsel
shall abuse the opposite party or indulge in offensive personalities. 116

Similarly, Canon 30 admonished a lawyer to “decline to conduct a
civil cause or to make a defense when convinced that it is intended merely
to harass or to injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong.”117
The Canons also acknowledged one particular circumstance where the
rights of third parties would trump a lawyer’s fidelity to his or her client.
Canon 37 provided that “The announced intention of a client to commit a
crime is not included within the confidences which he is bound to respect.
He may properly make such disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the
act or protect those against whom it is threatened,” although he is not

111 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908) (emphasis added). In this same spirit, the Canons
also stated that no client was entitled  to  receive  “any  service  or  advice  involving  disloyalty to the law . .
.  .”  CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 32 (1908).
112 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 32 (1908) (emphasis added).
113 Altman, supra note 85, at 2461.
114 Id. at 2475. Altman’s   article   concludes,   “[T]o lawyers in the twenty-first century, for whom
norms   of   lawyer   conduct   have   become   ‘legalized,’   [the   Canons]  may   seem   overly   ambitious.     But   to  
members of the Canons Committee, a normative statement regarding lawyer conduct implied something
imbued  with  morality  and,  in  at  least  some  members’  minds,  religion  as  well.”  Id. at 2499.
115 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon   17   (1908)   (“Whatever   may   be   the   ill-feeling existing
between clients, it should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward
each other or toward suitors in the cause. All personalities between lawyers should be scrupulously
avoided.”).
116 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 18 (1908).
117 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 30 (1908).
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compelled to do so.118 Implicit in this Canon is an acknowledgment that
there are times when the rights of a third party may trump a lawyer’s duty
to his or her client.
While the Canons articulated specific limits on advocacy that take into
consideration the rights of third parties, the Canons did not explicitly set
out the rights of third parties as an important corollary to respect for the
rule of law or as an important broad framework through which a lawyer
should consider the consequences of his or her actions when acting on
behalf of a client. In fact, the drafters of the Canons rejected a proposal to
include language similar to that found in the Alabama Code regarding
“limitations upon a lawyer’s zealous representation of his client in terms of
‘man’s accountability to his Creator, . . . the duty of obedience to law and
the obligation to his neighbor.”119
C.

The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
In 1969 the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (“Code”), which supplanted the Canons.120 The structure of
the Code differed from the Canons. Whereas the Canons consisted of only
ethical guidelines, the Code articulated nine general Canons each of which
was followed by ethical considerations and specific disciplinary rules.121
The Code explained that the Canons were statements of axiomatic norms,
the Ethical Considerations were aspirational in character, and the
Disciplinary Rules were mandatory in nature and were to form the
standards for disciplinary action as enforced by the various states.122 Like
the Canons, the Code contained principles regarding the rule of law’s limits
on a lawyer’s zealous advocacy, as well as some specific principles
regarding lawyers’ respect for the rights of third parties.
The Preamble to the Code starts with some recognition of the
relationship between the rule of law and the rights of individuals, although
it does not specifically put these ideas in the context of a lawyer’s conduct:
The continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon
recognition of the concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in
respect for the dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason for
enlightened self-government. Law so grounded makes justice possible, for only
CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 37 (1908).
Altman, supra note 85, at 2453 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980). The Code was amended in 1970 and
every year between 1974–1980. A copy of the Code with its amendments is available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/
mcpr.authcheckdam.pdf.
121 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980). The Preface to the
Code described some of the  deficiencies  with  the  Canons  as  follows,  “The  previous  Canons  were  not  an  
effective teaching instrument and failed to give guidance to young lawyers beyond the language of the
Canons themselves . . . . They were not cast in language designed for disciplinary enforcement and
many  abounded  with  quaint  expressions  of  the  past.”  Id. at Preface.
122 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980); see also Geoffrey C.
Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1251 (1991).
118
119
120
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through such law does the dignity of the individual attain respect and protection.
Without it, individual rights become subject to unrestrained power, respect for
law is destroyed, and rational self-government is impossible.123

The need for lawyers to respect the rule of law is also found
throughout the Code. For example, Ethical Consideration 1-5 states,
“Because of his position in society, even minor violations of law by a
lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession.
Obedience to law exemplifies respect for law. To lawyers especially,
respect for the law should be more than a platitude.”124 Respect for the rule
of law is also the central theme in Canon 7 of the Code, “A Lawyer Should
Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.”125 Similarly,
Ethical Consideration 7-19 states, “The duty of a lawyer to his client and
his duty to the legal system are the same; to represent his client zealously
within the bounds of the law.”126
The Code also permits a lawyer, as did the Canons, to inform a client
about the moral consequences of a course of action, although this
consideration is not expressed with the same primacy as it was in the
Canons.127 Instead, the Code provides:
Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal
considerations . . . . In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often
desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a decision
that is morally just as well as legally permissible. He may emphasize the
possibility of harsh consequences that might result from assertion of legally
permissible positions. In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always
remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or
methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for
himself.128

Although, as one writer concluded, “In the last analysis, the Code is
not a guide to moral action. The Code, with its emphasis on the rules,
presents as the ultimate question to be answered, ‘How do I stay out of
trouble?’ rather than ‘How do I make the moral choice?’”129
Like the Canons, the Code does not contain any broad statement that
advocacy should be constrained by the interests of third parties, but it did
include specific provisions that related to a lawyer’s obligation to respect
the rights of third parties in some instances. For example, Ethical
Consideration 2-30 warns lawyers not to accept employment when “the
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1980) (emphasis added).
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1980).
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980).
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1980).
See CANONS, supra note 109.
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980) (emphasis added).
Thomas G. Bost, The Lawyer as Truth-Teller: Lessons from Enron, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 505, 514
(2004); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 79   (1994)   (describing   the   “amazing   shrinking  
concept of the lawyer as  an  independent  counselor”).
123
124
125
126
127
128
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person seeking to employ him desires to institute or maintain an action
merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring another.”130
Also, Disciplinary Rule 4-101 permitted, but like the Canons did not
require, a lawyer to reveal “[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime
and the information necessary to prevent the crime,” which would in many
instances impact the rights of third parties.131 The ethical considerations in
the Code further provided:
In the exercise of his professional judgment on those decisions which are for his
determination in the handling of a legal matter, a lawyer should always act in a
manner consistent with the best interests of his client. However, when an action
in the best interest of his client seems to him to be unjust, he may ask his client
for permission to forego such action.132

One can infer that at times an action may be unjust because of its
impact on third parties, although the Code did not explicitly state this.
D.

The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
While the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rules”) were
133
not adopted until 1983 —over a decade after Watergate—the events of
Watergate were in many ways responsible for spurring the legal profession
to revisit the Code of Professional Responsibility.134 A group of lawyers
headed by Robert Kutak, known as the Kutak Commission, worked for six
years to draft the Model Rules.135 Watergate also prompted the ABA to
adopt a law school accreditation requirement that compels accredited law
schools to provide students with legal ethics instruction.136
The structure of the Rules differed from the Code. The Code
contained canons, ethical considerations and disciplinary rules.137 The
Rules, however, abandoned this tripartite structure for a structure that
contained black letter rules followed by explanatory comments for each
rule.138 Preceding the black letter rules is a Preamble that sets out broad
130 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-30 (1980); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109 (1980); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1980).
131 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980); compare with CANONS OF
PROF’L ETHICS Canon 37 (1908).
132 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-9 (1980).
133 While the Rules were first adopted in 1983 they have been amended numerous times. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2009).
134 See, e.g., Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 67–68 (discussing the impact of Watergate on reforms in
the legal profession); Robert W. Meserve, Action 1972–73—American Bar Association, 59 A.B.A. J.
986, 990 (1973) (“[T]he involvement of prominent lawyers in the Watergate affair has heightened
professional  concerns  about  discipline.”).
135 Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 68.
136 See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Teaching Legal Ethics a Quarter of a Century After Watergate,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 661 (2000); Clark, supra note 50, at 673. The Committee that drafted  the  ABA’s  
1908 Canons of Ethics had actually recommended in its 1907 report that ethics be taught in all law
schools and that applicants to the bar be examined on that topic. Altman, supra note 85, at 2420–21.
137 See Preface, supra, note 120.
138 ABA, THE MODEL RULES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note
83, at 3–4 (discussing the change in the format and the rationale for the change).
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guidelines regarding the lawyer’s role and responsibilities. To the extent
that the Rules set out aspirational principles as found in the ethical
considerations of the Code, those principles are found in the Preamble and
in the comments to the Rules.139 A predominate goal of the Rules,
however, was to legalize the regulation of the legal profession by adopting
enforceable rules and moving away from ethical standards that contained
unenforceable aspirations.140
While the structure differed, the Rules, like the Canons and the Code,
continued to emphasize the lawyer’s respect for and adherence to the rule
of law. The Preamble to the Rules states “[a] lawyer’s conduct should
conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to
clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs . . . . A lawyer
should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve
it . . . .”141
The Rules acknowledge that at times a lawyer’s job will create
conflicts “between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system
and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical person while
earning a satisfactory living.”142 While “remaining an ethical person” may
be read to encompass a concern about the rights of third parties, the Rules
do not explicitly articulate that consideration as part of the web of conflicts
which a lawyer must sometimes confront.143 This section states that
sometimes the Rules will provide a direct answer to the conflict, but
sometimes they will not, and the lawyer must be guided by the basic
principles underlying the Rules.144 The Rules further state that “[t]hese
principles include the lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a
client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while
maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons
involved in the legal system.”145 While third parties certainly have an
interest in courteous and civil treatment, a clear principle affirming respect
for the rights of third parties would include a broader articulation of their
interests.

139 Id. at   10   (“Professor   Geoffrey   C.   Hazard,   Jr.,   Reporter   of   the   Commission,   noted   that   the  
Preamble   was   intended   to   set   forth   balanced   and   realistic   statements   about   a   lawyer’s role and
responsibilities.”)  Such aspirational principles can also be found in some of the comments to the rules,
which   at   times   discuss   what   a   lawyer   “should”   do.   Id. at 15. See also David Luban & Michael
Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 56–57 (1995)
(finding ethical aspirations in some of the permissive rules).
140 See William H. Simon, Conceptions of Legality, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 669, 670–71 (2000); Luban
& Millemann, supra note 139, at 46–51; Hazard, supra note 122, at 1241–42, 1253–55.
141 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 5 (2009).
142 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 9 (2009).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. Respect for the rule of law is also embodied in other provisions of the Rules that are
analogous to provisions in the Canons and the Code. For example, Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a lawyer from
counseling a client to engage, or assisting a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. Id. at R.
1.2(d).
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Like the Code, the Rules continue to contemplate that a lawyer’s
advice may include moral factors, although the moral independence of the
attorney is not stressed as it was in the Canons.146 Rule 2.1 states that: “In
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer
not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social
and political factors, which may be relevant to the client’s situation.”147
The comments to Rule 2.1 suggest that moral factors could include the
impact on third parties:
Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially
where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are
predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be
inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical
considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as
such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and
may decisively influence how the law will be applied.148

Other provisions of the Rules also have an underlying concern for
some rights of third parties. For example, Rule 3.4 prohibits a variety of
activities that are deemed to be unfair to opposing parties and their counsel,
such as unlawfully obstructing their access to evidence or falsifying
evidence.149 Rule 3.8 compels prosecutors to ensure that the accused have
been advised of their right to obtain counsel and to be given the opportunity
to do so.150 Also, Rule 4.1 prohibits lawyers from making a false statement
of material fact to any third parties during the course of their representation
of clients.151
Significant changes in the Model Rules that resulted from Watergate
included the confidentiality rules in Rule 1.6, which are implicitly driven
by concern for the rights of third parties.152 Rule 1.6 defined a lawyer’s
duty of confidentiality more broadly than did the Code.153 As the Kutak
Commission originally proposed, however, Rule 1.6 permitted a lawyer to

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009).
Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (2011) (emphasis added); see also Russell
Pearce, How Law Firms Can Do Good While Doing Well (And the Answer is not Pro Bono), 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211,   216   (proposing   a   new   Model   Rule   that   would   restore   lawyers’   morally  
accountability); Kevin H. Michels, Lawyer Independence: From Ideal to Viable Legal Standard, 61
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 85, 126–30 (2010) (arguing that Rule 2.1 has been fairly dormant and that states
should make its practical application more robust).
149 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2009).
150 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b) (2009).
151 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2009).
152 See, e.g., Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 68. Model  Rule  1.13,  which  addressed  a  lawyer’s  duties
when representing an organization, was another significant development post-Watergate. Id. The initial
version of Rule 1.13 the ABA adopted was disappointing to many critics of the legal profession who
had hoped for more radical reform after Watergate. Id. at 70. After Enron, those rules were revisited and
amended again. Id. at 85.
153 ABA, THE MODEL RULES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES supra note
83, at 48; see also Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 71.
146
147
148
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reveal a client’s confidences in several situations that would benefit third
parties, including
to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer
reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or in
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another; [and] to rectify
the consequences of a client’s criminal or fraudulent act in furtherance of which
the lawyer’s services had been used.154

These exceptions in initial drafts, however, immediately became a
subject of debate and amendment. “The debate focused on the problem of
balancing the sometimes conflicting interests of lawyer, client and the
public.”155 Proponents argued that the proposed rule struck the right
balance between a client’s right to have confidences protected and the
public’s right to be protected from criminal acts.156 Opponents, however,
argued successfully that the exceptions were too broad and inhibited
lawyer-client communication.157 Thus, Rule 1.6, as adopted, contained
limited exceptions that permitted a lawyer to reveal confidential
information “to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm.”158 This was a narrower exception than the one in the Code, which
permitted a lawyer to reveal the “intention of his client to commit a crime
and the information necessary to prevent the crime.”159
Rule 1.6, as adopted in 1983, was a disappointment to many lawyers
who had hoped for more radical reform after Watergate.160 The majority of
states declined to adopt the rule as adopted by the House of Delegates.161
There were two subsequent efforts to amend Rule 1.6 to contain provisions
similar to those proposed by the Kutak Commission, but both of them
failed.162 It was not until 2003 that Rule 1.6 was amended to allow a
lawyer to reveal confidences in situations originally contemplated by the

154 ABA, THE MODEL RULES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES supra note
83, at 48. There was also an exception when a lawyer needed to disclose confidences to establish a
claim or defense in a controversy arising out of the legal representation. Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 48–49.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 51. There also remained an exception when a lawyer needed to disclose confidences to
establish a claim or defense in a controversy arising out of the legal representation. Id. See id. at 51 for
a red-lined version of the proposed rule as amended.
159 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(C)(3) (1969); see also Rochvarg, supra
note 4, at 71–72.   The   ABA   also   rejected   the   Code’s prior rule that required a lawyer to disclose a
client’s  fraud  to  try  to  rectify  that  fraud  and,  instead,  prohibited  such  disclosures.  Id.
160 Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 70.
161 Id. at 73.
162 ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1982–2005, at 115, 117 (2006) [hereinafter ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
Unsuccessful efforts to amend Model Rule 1.6 were first made in 1991. Id. at 115. Another round of
unsuccessful efforts occurred in 2001. Id. at 117–32. See also Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 73.
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Kutak Commission.163 Since that amendment, Rule 1.6 now provides, in
part:
b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the
lawyer’s services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests
or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted
from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which
the client has used the lawyer’s services.164

It is not a coincidence that these amendments finally occurred in the
wake of Enron, a financial scandal that also impacted the reputation of the
legal profession.165
III. THE LEGAL PROFESSION POST-WATERGATE
Many lawyers have correctly pointed out that the Code, which was the
national model for a code of ethics at the time of Watergate, left no
ambiguity about the impropriety of acts such as breaking, entering, perjury
and obstruction of justice.166 Many lawyers, however, were involved in
these activities despite clear ethical guidance not to break the law.167 In
1973, ABA President Robert W. Meserve wrote the following about
Watergate:
This is much more than an ethical problem. No one needs a course in ethics to
know that burglary or perjury is illegal or immoral. What is needed is an
acceptance of a reasonable respect for law and a recognition that no one—
however high or low his rank—is above it.168

ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 162, at 133–41.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2009). This amendment to Model Rule 1.6 was
adopted   at   the   ABA’s   Annual   Meeting   in   2003.   ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 162, at
133–34.
165 See Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 85–86.
166 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 9, 34–35   (2002)   (“Most   observers   found   it   ludicrous   to   suppose   that   the   massive   misconduct  
among Nixon appointees and campaign contributors stemmed from their lack of familiarity with bar
codes  of  conduct.”);;   Interview   with  Chesterfield  Smith,  President,  ABA,  in  S.F.,  Cal.  (Feb.  25,  1974)  
The Bar and Watergate: Conversation with Chesterfield Smith, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 31, 34 (1974)
[hereinafter Interview] (disregarding suggestions that the Code needed to be revised in response to
Watergate   because   “[b]reaking   and   entering,   lying,   obstructing   justice,   or   perjuring   oneself   is   a  
violation  under  any  standard  I’ve  ever  heard  of”);;  Robert  W.  Meserve,  Our Profession & Watergate, 2
STUDENT LAW. 9, 11, 60 (1973–74)   (“Surely,   it   does   not   require   a   close   reading   of   the   Code   of  
Professional Responsibility to support the proposition that breaking and entering is wrong, that perjury
is  wrong,  or  that  bribery  is  wrong.”).  
167 See supra Part I.
168 Robert W. Meserve, Watergate: Lessons and Challenges for the Legal Profession, 59 A.B.A. J.
681, 681 (1973).
163
164
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Thus, many lawyers suggested that revising the Code would not
prevent future situations like Watergate.169 Indeed, since the adoption of
the Model Rules, there have been subsequent events involving lawyers that
have once again damaged the reputation of the legal profession to varying
degrees.170
A small number of lawyers engaging in misconduct are inevitable.171
As Chesterfield Smith, the President of the ABA in 1974 said, “I would
hope that someday [lawyers] could get to be lily-white, but realistically I
don’t believe that’s possible.”172 Humans are not infallible and a minority
of lawyers will always fall from grace regardless of the cultural and legal
limits society imposes. Furthermore, attorney discipline, civil lawsuits and
criminal lawsuits give society tools to hold such wrongdoers accountable
for their actions, and to send a deterrent message to others. The legal
profession should, however, continue to examine whether it can further
improve itself through the rules it has adopted and the culture that it creates
within the profession.173 Even though it is a small number of lawyers who
engage in conduct that diminishes the reputation of the legal profession,
that small number has a profound impact on the public’s perception of the
profession.174 Any reduction in that small number should be of significant
benefit to the public and the legal profession.
If the law plainly prohibited the conduct of many of the actors in
Watergate, then what motivated their decisions? The conduct of the actors
involved in Watergate has, in many instances, been explained by the
context in which the actors were placed—government offices—and
specifically the White House, with all of its power and prestige.175 There is
undoubtedly some truth to that, but the motivation to please a powerful
client can arise in many other contexts than the White House. In today’s
competitive business world, private attorneys must fight to retain the
business of their clients or risk losing income and frequently jobs.176 This
See supra text accompanying note 166.
See infra text accompanying note 179.
Rotunda, supra note 136, at 661, 663–65 (listing some malpractice claims based on ethical
violations).
172 See Interview, supra note 166, at 31.
173 See Marianne M. Jennings, The Disconnect Between and Among Legal Ethics, Business Ethics,
Law, and Virtue: Learning Not to Make Ethics so Complex, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 995, 997–98 (2004)
(arguing   that   at   the   point   that   a   client’s   fraud   begins   “the   codified   ethical   standards   and   legal  
prohibitions are inapplicable. Virtue  is  required  and  courage  of  convictions  demanded.”).
174 See Sandra   Day   O’Connor, Foreword to RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK:
LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS vii   (2008)   (“It   takes   only   a   few   betrayals,  
however, to seriously damage the reputation of lawyers, both individual and collective. If the legal
profession  is  to  prevent  breaches  of  trust,  it  needs  to  understand  how  and  why  they  occur.”).
175 See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 79,  at  268  (“To  a  staff associate, even a highly placed one, the
prestige of the Presidential office can be awe-inspiring. In this context, it takes heroic effort for the
subordinate  to  recognize  that  a  President’s  whims  are  not  necessarily  made  of  cast  iron.”).
176 See ABEL, supra note 174, at 58–59  (“[M]any   lawyers  feel  pressure  from  clients  to  facilitate  
illegal activity. And 38 percent  of  Americans  believe  that  ‘most  lawyers  would  engage  in  unethical  or  
illegal activities to help a client in an  important  case.’”)  (footnotes  omitted);;  Rhode  &  Paton,  supra note
166,   at   26   (“The   challenges   of   maintaining   independent   judgment   are   compounded   in   a   competitive  
169
170
171
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can create incredible pressure to satisfy the demands of clients who are not
bound by our professional rules of ethics or frequently even interested in
hearing about them. There continues to be a danger that lawyers’ selfinterests create pressure to serve the demands of powerful clients and that
this can at times compromise their judgment and ethics.177 The Carnegie
Foundation noted this danger in its 2007 report on legal education: “In
many professional settings [the] lofty ideals of public spirit and service to
clients can seem far removed from reality. The press of business
demands . . . frequently focuses thoughts elsewhere than on the public
purposes of the profession.”178
A brief overview of a couple of more recent stories involving lawyers
will follow to explore, albeit briefly and anecdotally, other contexts where
the lawyers’ self-interest in serving clients lead to problematic conduct.
Such conduct frequently has an adverse effect on third parties and,
concomitantly, on the legal profession.
One of the more notorious recent events was the collapse of Enron.179
While no lawyers were subject to any criminal charges or disciplinary
action as a result of Enron,180 many people raised questions about the role
lawyers played in its demise.181 Enron’s failure had a grave impact on the
interests of third parties as “more than 4000 employees lost their jobs [and]
thousands of investors also lost their life savings, as ‘$70 billon in wealth
vanished.’”182 Enron’s collapse mainly involved corporate officials,
accountants and bankers, but lawyers were in the picture, too.183 Enron had
in-house and outside counsel, both of whom were advising it on the
structuring of financial transactions and financial disclosure
requirements.184 Enron’s accounting firm, Andersen, also had in-house

market where powerful clients can shop for expedient rather than  for  ethical  advice.”).
177 Jerold S. Auerbach, The Legal Profession After Watergate, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1287, 1288
(1976)  (arguing  that  “Watergate  demonstrated  the  attitude,  all  too  prevalent  in  the  modern  history  of  the  
legal profession, that law should serve power”);;   see also Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1322–25 (2006) (discussing the impact of self-interest and group-thinking on
ethical reasoning); Susan D. Carle, Power   as   a   Factor   in   the   Lawyers’   Ethical   Deliberation, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 118–20 (2006) (arguing for a model of ethical decision-making that considers
the  power  of  one’s  client  in  light  of  other  interests  at  stake  in  litigation).
178 CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 126–27 (2007).
179 For an overview of the key facts relating to the collapse of Enron, see Rhode & Paton, supra
note 166, at 13–17.
180 See Lawrence J. Fox, Can Confidentiality Survive Enron, Arthur Anderson, and the ABA?, 34
STETSON L. REV.  147,  152  (2004)  (“Nobody  had  found  that  there  was  a  single  lawyer  who  was  aware  of  
things  that  should  have  been  reported  up  the  corporate  ladder  and  had  failed  to  do  so.”).
181 See, e.g., Richard Acello, Enron Lawyers in the Hot Seat: Bankruptcy Examination Outlines
Possible Causes of Action, 90 A.B.A. J. 22, 22–24 (2004); Bernard S. Carrey, Enron—Where Were the
Lawyers?, 27 VT. L. REV. 871, 871–72 (2003); Susan P. Koniak, Who Gave Lawyers a Pass?,
Forbes.com
(Aug.
12,
2002),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/
2002/0812/058_print.html.
182 Rhode & Paton, supra note 166, at 9–10; see also Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 74.
183 Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 74–75.
184 Rhode & Paton, supra note 166, at 17, 19.
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counsel who became the center of a controversy regarding the timing of
Andersen’s destruction of documents.185
Some legal commentators have argued that the lawyers should have
disclosed their client’s misconduct to the Securities & Exchange
Commission.186 Many have viewed this event through the lens of an
attorney’s obligations when representing an organization, as well as an
attorney’s duty of confidentiality.187 Others have viewed the events
through the lens of conflicts of interest.188 For example, Enron’s outside
counsel relied on Enron’s business for more than seven percent of its
revenues—Enron was the firm’s largest client.189 “Over the years V&E
[Vinson & Elkins, Enron’s outside counsel] had represented Enron in a
wide range of matters, with Enron paying the firm legal fees of over $162
million in the five years ending with 2001.”190 The desire to keep that
client satisfied must have been tremendous.
These are certainly valid perspectives from which to view the Enron
scandal. But it is also worth thinking about whether the lawyers
sufficiently considered the impact of their client’s conduct on third parties
when they were advising their clients. Did they consider the impact on all
of the retirees who would be left with no income because of their client’s
fraud? Did they consider all of the jobs that would be lost when Enron
collapsed? Certainly the interests of third parties may be legitimately
injured during the course of economic competition and events such as
mergers, downsizing, etc. But when the rights of third parties are injured
because of fraud, the need for the lawyer to consider third parties’ interests
becomes particularly heightened. “As many legal ethics experts note, in
cases of client misconduct, lawyers’ professional norms of client loyalty
often conflict with personal norms of honesty and integrity. To reduce the
cognitive dissonance, lawyers will often unconsciously dismiss or discount
evidence of misconduct and its impact on third parties.”191
The federal government’s response to Enron—Sarbanes Oxley—
embodies the idea that “every attorney owes an obligation to the public
separate from an attorney’s obligation to his client.”192 This position
received strong opposition from the legal profession.193 The legal
profession, however, has been more accepting of the lawyer’s obligation to
the public when the lawyer is a prosecutor. Model Rule 3.8 articulates
special duties for prosecutors, and the comments to that Rule explain that

185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Id. at 21–24; see also Koniak, supra note 181.
Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 75.
Id.
Rhode & Paton, supra note 166, at 25.
Id.
Bost, supra note 129, at 506.
Rhode & Paton, supra note 166, at 32 (emphasis added).
Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 82.
Id. at 82–83.
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“[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply
that of an advocate.”194
The case that came to be known as the Duke Lacrosse rape case is a
recent notorious example of a prosecutor who did not act as a minister of
justice. Prosecutor Michael Nifong was the district attorney for Durham
County, North Carolina when he filed rape charges against three lacrosse
players at Duke University—all of whom were eventually declared
innocent.195 Nifong’s overzealous prosecution of the case appears to have
been motivated by a desire to please his “client,” i.e. the people of Durham
County who were soon going to choose whether or not to reelect him.196
The Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the North Carolina State Bar
found that prosecutor Nifong violated many rules in the Duke Lacrosse
rape case, including Rule 3.8.197 The Chairman of the Disciplinary Hearing
Commission made several comments about Nifong’s apparent motivation
for his conduct:
[W]hat we have here, it seems, is that we had a prosecutor who was faced with a
very unusual situation in which the confluence of his self-interest collided with a
very volatile mix of race, sex and class . . . . But we can make no other
conclusion that those initial statements that he made were to forward his political
ambitions . . . . It’s an illustration of the fact that character—good character—is
not a constant. Character is dependent upon the situation. Probably any one of us
could be faced with a situation at some point that would test our good character
and we would prove wanting. And that has happened for Mike Nifong.198

The Chairman also specifically discussed the victims of Nifong’s
misconduct, who were “the three young men to start with, their families,
the entire lacrosse team and their coach, Duke University, the justice
system in North Carolina and elsewhere.”199 The subsequent order that
disbarred Nifong also discussed how his conduct harmed third parties:
Nifong’s misconduct resulted in significant actual harm to Reade Seligman,
Collin Finnerty, and David Evans and their families . . . . As a result of Nifong’s
misconduct, these young men experienced heightened public scorn and loss of
privacy while facing very serious criminal charges of which the Attorney
General of North Carolina ultimately concluded they were innocent. 200

Watergate and the two examples discussed above do not suggest that
the lawyers acted with a desire or motivation to harm the interests of third

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2009).
N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35, Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order of Discipline, at 2 (July 24, 2007) [hereinafter Nifong Order], available at
http://www.ncbar.gov/Nifong%20Final%20Order.pdf.
196 Id. See also Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False
Identifications:  A  Fundamental  Failure  to  “Do  Justice”,  76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1354–57 (2007).
197 Nifong Order, supra note 195, at 20–21.
198 Comments
of Disciplinary Panel's Chairman, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/us/17duke-text.html?pagewanted=all.
199 Id.
200 Nifong Order, supra note 195, at 23.
194
195
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parties. Their motives differed in each situation, although to some extent
they were all pursing their self-interests by serving the real or perceived
demands of their clients. The outcome of their conduct in each situation
was similar—they all adversely impacted the interests of third parties and,
concomitantly, the reputation of the legal profession. Perhaps encouraging
lawyers to view their decision-making process through the lens of the
impact on third parties, at least in part, could help improve lawyer decisionmaking and judgment.
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS TO THE MODEL RULES AND
LEGAL EDUCATION
A. Reforms to the Model Rules
Reforms to the Model Rules alone are unlikely to change the culture of
the legal profession, but they can be an important component.201 As this
article has suggested, the Rules should inculcate in lawyers not just a
respect for the rule of law, which is paramount to a government based on
laws, but a more humanistic respect for the interests of third parties.
Viewing conduct through this lens could provide three possible benefits.
First, it could give a lawyer a perspective to view his or her conduct that
could deter misconduct. Second, even if the conduct that will harm the
interests of a third party is permissible, thinking about these implications
may give lawyers a more tangible perspective to consider when they are
advising their clients about the “right thing to do.” Third, again, even if the
conduct that will harm the interests of a third party is permissible, thinking
about such implications may cause lawyers to reflect on whether the
current rules have struck the right balance between the interests of clients
and the interests of third parties, or whether legal reform is appropriate.202
Scholars have written about the increase in lawyer regulation and the
decrease in the demoralization of legal ethics over time.203 Whether or not
a lawyer should be a moral advisor and/or independent moral actor has
been a topic of debate in legal scholarship.204 Even if one did agree that a

201 Rhode & Paton, supra note 166,   at   31   (“Of   course,   reforming   professional   rules   will   not   of  
itself transform professional culture . . . . Regulation is no substitute for internalized norms, but it can
foster  their  development  and  reinforce  their  exercise.”).
202 For example, the recent case of Alton Logan, who two lawyers knew had been wrongfully
convicted for twenty-six years because their client had confessed he was the real killer, has raised anew
the   debate   over   a   lawyers’   duty   of   confidentiality   to   his   or   her   client.   See, e.g., James E. Moliterno,
Rectifying   Wrongful   Convictions:   May   a   Lawyer   Reveal   Her   Client’s   Confidences   to   Rectify   the  
Wrongful Conviction of Another?, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 811, 816–20 (2011); Harold J. Winston,
Learning from Alton Logan, 2 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 173, 173 (2009).
203 See, e.g., Altman, supra note 85, at 2398–99; Luban & Millemann, supra note 139, at 41–42.
204 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1317–19 (2006).
This debate is also sometimes framed as a debate between a client-centered and a justice-centered
approach  to  lawyers’  ethical  obligations.  Carle,   supra note 177, at 116–17. The Model Rules do state
that when giving legal advice, a lawyer may refer to other considerations such as moral factors. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009).
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lawyer should be a moral advisor, in today’s world of moral plurality, there
may not be agreed upon norms explaining what it means to be “moral,”
which could meaningfully guide the actions of lawyers. “Morality” in
early codes was strongly tied to Christianity, which is not of much
assistance in today’s world of religious diversity in lawyers’ personal lives
and secularism in the law. Thus, returning to broad notions of the lawyer
as an autonomous moral actor may not provide much meaningful guidance.
Instead of focusing on “morality,” as a guiding principle for lawyers, it
may be more helpful if the Model Rules articulated more specific principles
that elaborate on what it means to be a “moral” advisor or actor.
The Model Rules specifically guide lawyers to assess their conduct in
light of compliance with the rule of law, compliance with their duties to
their clients, and compliance with their duties to the administration of
justice as an officer of the court.205 The Model Rules, however, are fairly
scant in their focus on assessing the impact of a lawyer’s conduct on third
parties.206 Thus, it may be beneficial if the Model Rules specifically
advised a lawyer to consider the effects of his or her conduct on the rights
of third parties as part of their ethical decision-making framework. “When
the lawyer fully understands the nature of his office, he will then discern
what restraints are necessary to keep that office wholesome and
effective.”207
The Model Rules and its predecessor, the Code, have served two main
functions. One is to set out specific standards that can be enforced in
disciplinary proceedings. The other is to set out the values and the moral or
philosophical framework from which lawyers should approach ethical
decisions.208 In this regard, perhaps the ABA’s decision to eliminate the
Canons’ aspirational ethical considerations from the Model Rules was a
loss. The Model Rules focused on setting out the black letter law regarding
the conduct of lawyers in greater detail, but perhaps at the expense of the
more nuanced and complex considerations of the role of the lawyer that
were in the ethical considerations of the Code. Professor William H.
Simon critiqued the Model Rules as follows:
The way we now tend to teach our students legal ethics in the courses that have
been mandated in the wake of Watergate tends to emphasize relatively
mechanical, unreflective rule-following at the expense of relatively complex
contextual judgment . . . . The Model Rules were explicitly drafted for the
purpose of creating black letter rules (that is the term that the drafters used) that
obviate complex judgment. The predecessor code of the ABA actually had a
series of norms that were designed to inspire complex judgment—the so-called

Supra Part III.
The Model Rules do provide guidance about the treatment of third parties in specific situations.
See supra Part III.
207 Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference,
44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159 (1958).
208 Supra Part II.
205
206
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‘ethical considerations’—aspirational norms that were eliminated by the Model
Rules precisely to reduce legal ethics to a matter of black letter rule following. 209

The idea of inculcating concerns for the interests of third parties as
part of the ethical framework through which lawyers view their decisions
and their advice to their clients would work better as an ethical aspiration
that can inform a lawyer’s approach to ethical decisions than as a rule that
could be a basis for disciplinary enforcement.210 This idea could be
included by reintroducing something akin to the Code’s ethical
considerations or by incorporating it into the current Preamble to the Model
Rules, which does set out the broad framework regarding a lawyer’s role.211
For example, the Preamble could be revised to include this concept in
Paragraphs 2 and 9 of the Preamble. The proposed additional language is
in italics:
[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As
advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client’s
legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the
adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the
client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others. As an
evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client’s legal affairs and reporting about
them to the client or to others. [As an officer of the legal system, a lawyer shall
be loyal to the client. This should not, however preclude a lawyer from
considering, as part of the lawyer’s ethical decision-making, the rights and
interests of third parties that may be adversely affected by either the lawyer’s
conduct or the client’s conduct.]212
****
[9] In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are
encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a
lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own
interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The
Rules of Professional Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts.
Within the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of
professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the
exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic
principles underlying the Rules. These principles include the lawyer’s obligation
zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds
of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward

Simon, supra note 140, at 670–71.
See Tondel, supra note 39, at 296 (concluding that “[n]o Code amendment could give practical
expression to that revulsion” caused by the crimes committed by lawyers involved in Watergate); Susan
D. Carle, Power   as   a   Factor   in   the   Lawyers’   Ethical   Deliberation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 137
(2006)   (discussing   the   discretion   frequently   exercised   in   lawyers’   ethical   decision-making and the
inability of the positive law to determine what a lawyer should or should not do in every instance).
211 The  Scope  of  the  Rules  states  that  the  Rules  do  not  “however, exhaust the moral and ethical
considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely
defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a framework for  the  ethical  practice  of  law.” MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope 16 (2009).
212 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 2 (2009).
209
210
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all persons involved in the legal system. [These principles also include the
lawyer’s obligation as an officer of the legal system. While a lawyer’s duty of
loyalty to the client is usually paramount, the lawyer should consider whether a
course of conduct taken by a client or on behalf of a client would adversely
impact the interests of third parties. There are many times when this outcome is
legitimate, but sometimes it can be a sign of illegal conduct by a client or
misconduct by a lawyer. Even if the law allows for an outcome that adversely
impacts the interests of third parties, a lawyer should still discuss with his or her
client whether such an outcome is the right thing to do.]213

B.

Reforms to Legal Education
In addition to considering revisions to the Model Rules, legal
education would be an important component in training lawyers to consider
the impact of their conduct on the interests of third parties as part of their
ethical decision-making. In the wake of Watergate there have been
differing views about the importance that law schools have historically
placed on educating and training students in the matter of ethics.214 Legal
education continues to receive some criticism about how it teaches
professionalism, which includes education about the law of lawyering, in
addition to matters of morality and character.215 Some legal commentators
have criticized legal education, particularly the area of legal ethics, as being
too morally neutral.216 One law student commented, “[W]e don’t focus on
what is right, we just talk about what is legally feasible.”217
One commentator suggested that part of the circumstances leading to
Watergate included legal education’s agenda of banishing emotionality
from lawyers’ work.218 The Carnegie Foundation’s 2007 report on legal
education concluded that “[t]he kind of personal maturity that graduates
need in order to practice law with integrity and a sense of purpose requires
not only skills, but qualities such as compassion, respectfulness and
commitment.”219
Legal ethics pedagogy may benefit from the growing dialogue about
teaching law students emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence has
been defined as “a set of emotional competencies involving self-awareness
of emotions, empathetic awareness of the emotions of others, and the

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 9 (2009).
See, e.g., Burbank & Duboff, supra note 105,  at   17   (commenting   on   the  “apparent  dearth   of  
interest in and emphasis upon ethics exhibited by the fountainhead of legal training and conditioning,
the  law  schools  themselves”);;   compare with Weckstein, supra note 42, at 264 (countering allegations
that  legal  education  does  not  focus  on  ethics  and  asserting  that  “law  schools  do  teach  ethics,  probably  
more  and  better  than  ever  in  history”).
215 See CARNEGIE, supra note 178, at 136; see also Luban & Millemann, supra note 139, at 37–38.
216 See CARNEGIE, supra note 178, at 149.
217 Id. at 152.
218 Andrew S. Watson, The Watergate Lawyer Syndrome: An Educational Deficiency Disease, 26
J. LEGAL EDUC. 441, 443–44 (1974).
219 See CARNEGIE, supra note 178, at 146.
213
214
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ability to use this awareness to influence the behavior of others.”220 For
purposes of this discussion, the concept of empathy is the most important
and the following is a helpful definition:
“Empathy encompasses several related phenomena: (1) feeling the
emotions of another; (2) understanding another’s situation or experience;
and (3) taking actions based on another’s situation. Empathy involves
ways of knowing and understanding and can serve as a catalyst for either
action or restraint.”221 In this broader view, empathy is an essential
element of the concept of emotional intelligence. “Empathy, when it
primarily involves sympathy, leads to helping behaviors and even
altruism . . . . So viewed, that aspect of empathy has little role in actual
adversarial proceedings.”222
Research supports the proposition that lawyers with high levels of
emotional competencies are more successful persuaders, communicators,
and influencers and should be “more likely to give high priority to other
interests, such as improving the justice system.”223 This is important
because lawyers have the daily opportunity in their practice “to set by their
example, and even induce by their persuasion, standards of truth and right
in our society at large[.]”224
Much work has been done on teaching legal ethics in context by using
problems that give students an opportunity to address ethical issues through
different roles.225 Problem-based teaching has also been identified as an
important tool for teaching emotional intelligence.226 While current
scholarship focuses largely on emotional intelligence regarding a lawyer’s
understanding of his or her emotions and the client’s emotions,227 one way
to foster the expansion of legal morality is to include, in legal ethics
education, problems that focus on recognizing and empathizing with the
interests of third parties. “To a large extent people behave as they are
expected to behave, and their expectations arise less from what they are
told than from the examples they observe.”228
Montgomery, supra note 8, at 326.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id. at 347.
224 Tondel, supra note 39, at 298. For this reason, how law firms teach young lawyers about ethics
and   values   is   also   an   important   component   of   a   lawyer’s   education.   See Ronald D. Rotunda, Why
Lawyers are Different and Why We Are the Same: Creating Structural Incentives in Large Law Firms
to Promote Ethical Behavior—In-House Ethics Counsel, Bill Padding, and In-House Ethics Training,
44 AKRON L. REV. 679, 703–07 (2011).
225 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 50, at 675 (discussing teaching legal ethics in context); Reaves,
supra note 55,   at   35   (discussing   Professor   Sam   Dash’s   approach   to   teaching   legal   ethics   postWatergate,   where   the   materials   should   “constantly   place   the student in situations requiring role
definitions . . . . [R]ole-playing  is  essential.”).  
226 See Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 1173, 1198–1200 (1999).
227 See, e.g., Jan Salisbury M.S., Emotional Intelligence in Law Practice, 53 ADVOCATE 38
(2010); Silver, supra note 226, at 1202–03.
228 Weckstein, supra note 42, at 278.
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CONCLUSION
There is no one explanation that can account for lawyers’ improper
involvement in Watergate or for other events that have involved lawyers,
harmed third parties, and tarnished the reputation of the legal profession.
ABA President Robert Meserve suggested that “[t]he first lesson of
Watergate for us then may be that we must constantly preserve our
professional independence and detachment — not only from the
overzealous client who seeks what is improper, but from the urgings of our
own ambition and self-interest.”229 As this article has argued, one way to
do this may be to steer lawyers back to being morally accountable actors,
but in a way that provides specific guidance about what it means to be
“moral.” Considering the impact of a course of action on the interests of
third parties is one aspect of being a moral lawyer. The profession could
start to inculcate the consideration of the interests of third parties as a
component of a lawyer’s decision-making process by reforms to the Model
Rules and to legal education. In doing so, lawyers may be better enabled to
fulfill one commentator’s reflections about the role of the lawyer postWatergate:
We are not the keeper of our clients’ consciences, but neither are we mere
technicians whose sole function is to assure that legal limitations are narrowly
observed. . . . We fulfill the finest standards of our profession when our
informed legal opinion is supplemented by judicious counsel. Without
undertaking to preach to our clients, we can encourage them to ask us not just “is
it legal?” but “is it right?”230
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Robert Meserve, Our Profession and Watergate, 2 STUDENT LAW. 9, 60 (1973).
Richardson, supra note 79, at 271.

